

DDSA-ADD-TR-001
Direct Democracy & Sortition Assemblies
Transition Sequencing Protocol

A Constitutional Addendum to the DD&SA Corpus

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"We do not turn time back; we move forward with the wisdom its patterns reveal."

Preamble — Constitutional Standing of This Addendum

This Addendum is produced in direct response to the adversarial critique of DDSA-PUB-001, which identified three unresolved constitutional blockers in the transition architecture described in that document's Part VIII: the European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 Protocol 1 conflict; the question of Irish constitutional sovereignty; and the practical operability of the civic register. The critique further identified that the Civic Transition Authority (CTA), as described in DDSA-PUB-001, lacked a credible account of the first sortition before the Civic Sortition Authority (CSA) exists — the bootstrap problem — and of how existing security, legal, and media institutions are managed in the interregnum between the withdrawal of the existing system's authority and the consolidation of the Civic Commonwealth's.

This Addendum resolves each of these gaps. It is a load-bearing constitutional instrument: until its provisions are incorporated into the corpus, DDSA-PUB-001's claim to constitute a credible legal and operational pathway to the Civic Commonwealth of the British Isles is incomplete. This document does not supersede DDSA-PUB-001 or DDSA-DISS-001; it supplements and precisifies them.

The constitutional logic of this Addendum proceeds from a single foundational premise: the Civic Commonwealth derives its legitimacy not from the authority of any single designer, political movement, or transitional institution, but from a chain of constitutionally grounded procedures that can withstand legal challenge, democratic scrutiny, and the full adversarial force of those whose interests the transition displaces. Each link in that chain is specified here with the precision that constitutional operability requires.

Twelve Parts follow. Parts I through III address the pre-transition legal and institutional preparation, including the resolution of the three legal blockers. Parts IV through VI address the civic register, the bootstrap sortition problem, and the constitution of the Civic Transition Authority. Parts VII through IX address the transition phase sequencing, public service continuity, and the management of security and media institutions during the interregnum. Part X addresses international recognition. Part XI specifies the constitutional ratification process. Part XII provides failure protocols — what happens when the transition is legally challenged, politically stalled, or institutionally resisted.

Part I — The Constitutional Moment and the Legal Mandate

Article 1.1 — Defining the Constitutional Moment

The constitutional moment is the conjunction of three conditions: (a) a demonstrable and sustained collapse of public confidence in the existing system of governance, measured by independent longitudinal polling across all four nations of the British Isles; (b) a specific electoral or referendum mandate for the constitutional reform programme, obtained through the existing parliamentary process; and (c) the availability of the DD&SA corpus in a form sufficiently complete and legally reviewed to constitute a credible replacement architecture. All three conditions must be present. The existence of any two without the third does not constitute the constitutional moment for the purposes of this Addendum.

Condition (a) is a descriptive threshold, not a normative trigger. The determination that this threshold has been met is made by the DD&SA Foundation's Board on the basis of published independent polling data, and the Foundation's assessment is itself published and open to challenge. No single polling exercise constitutes the trigger; the threshold requires consistent evidence across a minimum of three major independent polling organisations over a minimum twelve-month period.

Condition (b) specifies the legal foundation of the transition. The Civic Commonwealth must be established through a legal instrument — a parliamentary Act or a Referendum Act — that commands the legal authority of the existing constitutional order. A bare parliamentary majority is insufficient; the mandate must either take the form of a referendum in which the constitutional reform programme is put directly to the electorate, or a general election in which the programme is the primary manifesto commitment of a government that wins a clear parliamentary majority.

Condition (c) requires that the full corpus — including all addenda and the legal audits specified in DDSA-ADD-LG-001 — has been published, subjected to external academic and legal review, and is available in accessible form to any inhabitant who wishes to engage with it. This Addendum is itself a component of condition (c).

Article 1.2 — The Constitutional Reform Act

The primary legislative instrument of the transition is the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) — a Westminster parliamentary Act, or its equivalent in the Scottish Parliament if the devolution consent requirements of Article 1.5 are met through that route, that formally enacts the constitutional mandate for the Civic Commonwealth. The CRA is the legal source of the Civic Transition Authority's authority, of the civic register construction programme, and of the constitutional ratification process.

The CRA must contain, at minimum, the following provisions: (a) a statement of constitutional purpose establishing the mandate for transition to sortition-based governance; (b) the establishment of the Civic Transition Authority with specified composition, authority, and time limits; (c) the establishment of the Provisional Civic Register Authority (PCRA) with the data-sharing powers necessary to construct the civic register from existing state records; (d) the ECHR Compliance Protocol specified in Article 2.2; (e) the provision for a constitutional ratification referendum within a specified timeframe; and (f) the sunset clause terminating all CRA-derived authorities on the date the Civic Commonwealth's Foundational Rules are ratified by referendum.

Article 1.3 — The Mandate Threshold

The constitutional mandate requires one of the following: (a) a confirmatory referendum in which the DD&SA constitutional reform programme is supported by a simple majority of votes cast on a turnout

of no less than fifty percent of the eligible electorate in each of the four principal nations; or (b) a general election in which the governing party or coalition has committed explicitly to the DD&SA programme and has won a parliamentary majority of no less than sixty seats. Where the mandate is achieved by route (b), the CRA must itself be ratified by a confirmatory referendum within eighteen months of enactment.

The turnout and majority thresholds are deliberate. A bare majority on low turnout does not constitute sufficient democratic authority for a constitutional transformation of this magnitude. The thresholds are set to ensure that the transition commands broad, active public support rather than the passive acquiescence of a disengaged electorate, without setting the bar so high as to make the transition practically unachievable.

Article 1.4 — Pre-Transition Preparatory Legislation

Before the constitutional moment, the DD&SA Foundation shall advocate for the passage of specific preparatory legislation that does not require the full constitutional mandate but significantly reduces the operational challenges of transition when the mandate is obtained. The following preparatory legislative instruments are identified as highest priority.

First, a Civic Register Preparatory Act, which authorises the Office for National Statistics to conduct a feasibility study of unified population register integration across HMRC, DWP, DVLA, and NHS datasets, and which establishes the data governance framework for any eventual civic register without committing to its activation. This preparatory Act creates no constitutional obligation and is entirely compatible with the existing system; it simply reduces the register construction time from an estimated three to five years to an estimated twelve to eighteen months once the full mandate is obtained.

Second, a Citizens' Assembly Pilot Programme Act, which provides statutory authority and public funding for at least six sortition-based citizens' assemblies at local and regional level across the British Isles, with full academic evaluation of their operation, within the three years preceding the anticipated constitutional moment. These pilots create the institutional knowledge, trained facilitator base, and public familiarity with sortition that reduce the operational risk of the first NSA session.

Article 1.5 — Devolution Consent — The Sewel Convention

The Sewel Convention — now given statutory expression in the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 — provides that the Westminster Parliament will not normally legislate in devolved matters without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The CRA, as a constitutional transformation Act, necessarily legislates in matters that are currently devolved. This creates the devolution consent problem identified in the adversarial critique.

There are three legally viable pathways to devolution consent. The first — preferred pathway — is that each devolved legislature (the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd, and the Northern Ireland Assembly) passes a Legislative Consent Motion approving the CRA before Westminster enacts it. This is achievable if the constitutional reform programme is designed with genuine devolution commitments that make LCM passage politically rational for the devolved legislatures. The DD&SA RSA architecture — which provides stronger and more constitutionally entrenched devolved authority than the current arrangements — provides precisely this incentive.

The second pathway — emergency reserve — is direct devolved referendum. If a devolved legislature declines to pass an LCM, the CRA may provide for a separate referendum within the relevant nation on the constitutional reform package as it applies to that nation. A majority in that referendum constitutes the democratic authority for the CRA to apply notwithstanding the absence of an LCM.

The third pathway — last resort — is assertion of parliamentary sovereignty. Westminster retains the constitutional authority, under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, to legislate without devolved consent. This pathway is constitutionally available but politically undesirable: it would undermine the Civic Commonwealth's founding legitimacy claim in the affected nation and should be used only where the absence of consent reflects factional resistance in the devolved legislature rather than genuine public opposition in the relevant nation.

Part II — Resolving the Three Legal Blockers

Article 2.1 — The ECHR Article 3 Protocol 1 Conflict

Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights provides that signatory states "undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this provision as requiring that the legislature be chosen through a process of free elections, and has consistently treated the Article 3 Protocol 1 guarantee as a positive obligation rather than merely a prohibition on interference with existing electoral processes.

The adversarial critique correctly identifies this as a genuine legal vulnerability: the replacement of an elected parliament with a sortition assembly removes the mechanism through which the Article 3 Protocol 1 right is exercised. Any government that enacts the CRA without addressing this conflict exposes itself to a challenge before the ECtHR that, if successful, would require either reinstatement of an elected chamber or withdrawal from the ECHR. Both outcomes are constitutionally and politically problematic.

The resolution is not to dismiss the ECHR conflict, but to engage with it strategically through two parallel tracks. The first track is the interpretive argument before the ECtHR itself. The Article 3 Protocol 1 guarantee speaks of "the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." A sortition-based legislature — in which every adult citizen has an equal probability of serving, rather than merely an equal vote in choosing those who serve — can be argued to embody a more complete expression of popular sovereignty than competitive election. This interpretive argument has not been tested before the ECtHR; its outcome is genuinely uncertain. But the Court's doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" — its recognition that member states have discretion in how they implement Convention rights — creates space for it to succeed.

The interpretive argument before the ECtHR: that a sortition assembly, by ensuring equal probability of service for every adult, delivers a more complete realisation of "the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature" than competitive election, which systematically selects from a socially unrepresentative political class.

The second track is treaty modification. The UK may submit a proposed modification to Article 3 Protocol 1 to the Council of Europe, clarifying that the guarantee is compatible with sortition-based legislative selection systems that meet defined democratic standards. The DD&SA architecture — with its comprehensive accountability mechanisms, its transparent deliberative procedures, and its structural representativeness — would need to be shown to meet a set of democratic standards agreed at Council of Europe level. This is a long-term diplomatic project, not a rapid legal fix; but it should be initiated by the DD&SA Foundation through engagement with the Council of Europe's Venice Commission well in advance of the constitutional moment.

During the period in which the ECtHR challenge is live — which may extend for several years after the CRA is enacted — the Civic Commonwealth shall maintain a specific constitutional posture: it is not defying the ECHR but engaging with it through its legitimate procedures. Any interim measures ordered by the ECtHR are complied with while the substantive proceedings continue. This posture minimises the political cost of the conflict while the legal outcome is determined.

Article 2.2 — The ECHR Compliance Protocol

As a transitional measure designed to reduce the legal vulnerability during the period of ECtHR proceedings, the CRA shall include an ECHR Compliance Protocol establishing a Civic Participation Panel (CPP). The CPP is a small sortition-selected body — twelve members, one-year terms — whose sole constitutional function is to conduct an annual "civic participation audit": a formal assessment of whether the mechanisms through which inhabitants engage in civic governance during the transition meet a set of participation standards developed by the Venice Commission.

The CPP is not a chamber of the Civic Commonwealth; it has no legislative authority. Its function is purely evidential — to produce a documented record that the Civic Commonwealth's governance mechanisms satisfy the substantive purposes of Article 3 Protocol 1 even if they do not do so through the form of competitive election. This record is submitted annually to the Council of Europe and constitutes the primary evidentiary basis for the Article 3 Protocol 1 interpretive argument.

Article 2.3 — The Irish Constitutional Sovereignty Question

The Civic Commonwealth of the British Isles, as specified in the DD&SA corpus, encompasses the Republic of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland is a sovereign state with its own constitution — Bunreacht na hÉireann — whose Article 46 specifies a precise amendment procedure requiring both Oireachtas passage and a popular referendum. No provision of Westminster parliamentary law has any constitutional purchase over this procedure. The adversarial critique is therefore correct that the inclusion of Ireland in the Civic Commonwealth requires a distinct Irish constitutional pathway that the existing corpus does not specify.

This Addendum specifies that pathway in full. It proceeds in four stages, each of which is constitutionally necessary and practically achievable. The stages are sequential; no stage may proceed without the completion of the stage preceding it.

Stage One — Diplomatic Framework: The DD&SA Foundation initiates a formal dialogue with the Irish government through the existing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, presenting the constitutional architecture of the Civic Commonwealth and seeking the Irish government's assessment of the conditions under which Irish participation would be constitutionally achievable and politically viable. This dialogue does not require any commitment from either government; it is the establishment of a formal diplomatic channel for the constitutional conversation.

Stage Two — Civic Deliberation in Ireland: A citizens' assembly in Ireland — constituted by stratified sortition from the Irish adult population, funded jointly by the Irish government and the DD&SA Foundation, and operating under full Fishkin deliberative protocol — deliberates on the question of Irish participation in the Civic Commonwealth. This assembly is advisory; its output is a detailed recommendation to the Oireachtas and to the Irish people, not a binding constitutional decision. The assembly specifically addresses the terms of Irish participation, the protections for Irish sovereignty within the Civic Commonwealth architecture, and the relationship between the Civic Commonwealth framework and Ireland's existing constitutional obligations, including its obligations under the Good Friday Agreement.

Stage Three — Oireachtas Approval: On the basis of the citizens' assembly's recommendation, the Oireachtas considers a constitutional amendment bill enabling Irish participation in the Civic Commonwealth. The bill must specify precisely the Irish constitutional modifications required — the scope of legislative competences transferred to the NSA, the protections for the remaining competences of the Oireachtas, and the mechanisms through which Ireland may withdraw from the Civic Commonwealth if a future referendum so determines.

Stage Four — Irish Referendum: The constitutional amendment bill is put to a referendum of the Irish people. A simple majority is sufficient, in accordance with Article 46 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, provided that the Oireachtas has approved the bill by an ordinary majority in both Houses. This referendum may

take place simultaneously with or subsequent to the British constitutional ratification referendum specified in Part XI, but it must take place before Irish participation in the Civic Commonwealth becomes constitutionally operative.

If the Irish referendum does not return a majority in favour of participation, the Civic Commonwealth proceeds without Ireland, as a Civic Commonwealth of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with the Irish relationship addressed through the bilateral arrangements of the British-Irish Intergovernmental structures that already exist. Ireland's participation in the Civic Commonwealth is therefore an aspiration and a design goal of the DD&SA architecture, but not a condition of its establishment. The corpus documents must be amended to reflect this: the "British Isles" designation is aspirational; the constitutional architecture operates in the first instance over Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with a specific mechanism for Irish accession when the Irish constitutional pathway is complete.

Article 2.4 — The Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 — an internationally binding treaty between the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland — creates specific constitutional obligations concerning Northern Ireland that the Civic Commonwealth architecture must explicitly honour. The Agreement's consent principle — that Northern Ireland's constitutional status may not be changed without the consent of a majority of its population — applies to any change in the governmental framework within which Northern Ireland operates.

The transition to the Civic Commonwealth constitutes a change in Northern Ireland's governmental framework. The CRA must therefore include a specific Northern Ireland Consent Provision, which provides that the CRA's application to Northern Ireland is conditional on a separate Border Poll conducted under the terms agreed between the two governments, or on a referendum conducted simultaneously with the main constitutional ratification referendum, in which the inhabitants of Northern Ireland separately endorse the transition.

The DD&SA architecture's treatment of Northern Ireland — specifically the RSA structure that reduces sectarian electoral dynamics by replacing competitive party elections with sortition-based governance — constitutes a genuine offer to the communities of Northern Ireland that is worth making clearly during the mandate-building phase. A governance system in which assembly membership is determined by lot rather than by community-aligned party vote structurally reduces the winner-takes-all dynamics that have repeatedly paralysed the existing power-sharing arrangements.

Part III — The Civic Register: Construction, Authority, and Integrity

Article 3.1 — Why the Civic Register Is the Critical Path

Every other element of the transition architecture depends on the civic register. The first NSA sortition cannot take place without a valid register; the CTA cannot be constituted without a valid register; the constitutional ratification referendum cannot produce a legitimate result without knowing the eligible population. The register is therefore on the critical path of the entire transition, and its construction timeline determines the minimum duration of every subsequent phase.

The adversarial critique identifies three specific vulnerabilities in the register: it does not currently exist; its construction requires the integration of incompatible government data systems; and any register built from existing data will reflect the underrepresentation of marginalised populations in those systems. Each vulnerability is addressed in a separate article below.

Article 3.2 — The Provisional Civic Register Authority

The CRA shall establish the Provisional Civic Register Authority (PCRA) as an operationally independent body reporting to Parliament — not to the Secretary of State — during the transition period. The PCRA has three functions: register construction, register maintenance, and register audit. It has no other functions. It does not operate the sortition; it supplies the data from which the sortition is conducted. The Civic Sortition Authority, when established, receives the register from the PCRA and operates it independently.

The PCRA is established on the date the CRA receives Royal Assent and must deliver a validated first-edition civic register within eighteen months of that date. This timeline is achievable if the preparatory legislation specified in Article 1.4 has been enacted; it extends to thirty months if it has not, because the data sharing agreements must be negotiated afresh. The transition sequencing in Part VII accounts for both scenarios.

Article 3.3 — Data Sources and Integration Architecture

The civic register is constructed from the following primary data sources, in order of reliability and coverage: the NHS Patient Register (England, Wales) and equivalent registers in Scotland (CHI Register) and Northern Ireland (BSO Register), which together cover approximately 99.3 percent of the resident population; HMRC National Insurance records; the DWP Customer Information System; the DVLA Driver Register; local authority housing records; and the existing electoral roll as a secondary supplementary source.

The NHS Patient Register is selected as the primary source because it is the most comprehensive existing population record in the British Isles, covers all ages from birth, and is maintained by a body with established data governance frameworks. Its coverage of marginalised populations — including rough sleepers, those with complex mental health needs, and those who have avoided contact with statutory services — is imperfect but significantly superior to the electoral roll, which has estimated non-registration rates of fifteen to twenty percent among adults from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in major urban areas.

Integration of these data sources requires a probabilistic record-linking methodology — a technique well established in health informatics — rather than exact-match linking, because the same individual appears in different source systems with varying forms of their name, address history, and date of birth. The PCRA shall contract the record-linking programme to the Office for National Statistics, which has

existing expertise and infrastructure for this work, with a published methodology that is open to independent audit.

Article 3.4 — Addressing Underrepresentation in the Register

Any register constructed from existing state data will undercount populations with low contact with statutory services: rough sleepers, undocumented residents, those in temporary or informal accommodation, recent legal migrants awaiting registration, and those from communities with historically low engagement with public institutions. The adversarial critique is correct that stratification cannot correct for a biased input pool, because stratification can only produce proportionality on characteristics that are present in the data.

The PCRA shall therefore commission a Register Coverage Survey in the twelve months preceding the delivery of the first-edition register. The Survey — drawing on the methodology used by the ONS for the Census Coverage Survey — will estimate the degree of undercount in each demographic stratum and geographic area, and will produce a set of weighting adjustments that are applied to the stratified sortition process to correct, as far as is statistically achievable, for the underrepresentation of undercounted populations.

In addition, the PCRA shall operate a six-month Open Registration Period before the first-edition register is closed, during which any adult resident who does not appear in the register as constructed may apply for inclusion through a simplified procedure requiring only proof of address and identity. The Open Registration Period is accompanied by an active outreach programme, conducted in partnership with local authorities, charities working with marginalised populations, and community organisations, specifically targeting the groups most likely to be undercounted.

Article 3.5 — Register Integrity and Anti-Manipulation Safeguards

The civic register, as the foundation of every sortition process in the Civic Commonwealth, is the single most valuable target for manipulation. Any actor seeking to influence the composition of sortition assemblies has an incentive to manipulate the register — by inflating the representation of populations likely to favour their interests, or suppressing the representation of populations likely to oppose them.

The following safeguards are constitutionally required. First, the register is maintained by the PCRA, not by any ministerially controlled body; any ministerial attempt to direct register construction methodology is a criminal offence under the CRA. Second, all methodology documents, including the record-linking algorithm and the stratification weighting adjustments, are published in full and subjected to independent expert review within thirty days of publication. Third, the Democratic Standards Panel has a standing mandate to commission annual independent audits of register accuracy, with the audit reports published in full. Fourth, any individual may challenge their inclusion in or exclusion from the register through a formal review process with a published determination, and any pattern of rejections in a specific geographic area or demographic stratum triggers automatic PCRA investigation.

Part IV — The Bootstrap Problem: First Sortition Before the CSA Exists

Article 4.1 — Defining the Bootstrap Problem

The bootstrap problem is the following: the Civic Sortition Authority — the body responsible for conducting all sortition processes in the Civic Commonwealth — is itself constituted by sortition. But before the CSA exists, there is no body authorised to conduct the sortition that would constitute it. This circularity is not merely theoretical; it is the precise operational gap that prevents the transition architecture from being self-starting without external authority.

The bootstrap problem must be resolved at the level of the CRA itself. The Act must specify the exact authority and procedure by which the first sortition is conducted before any DD&SA institution exists, and must ensure that this procedure is legally grounded, politically neutral, and technically verifiable. The resolution adopted here is the Provisional Sortition Commission.

Article 4.2 — The Provisional Sortition Commission

The CRA shall establish the Provisional Sortition Commission (PSC) as a time-limited statutory body with a single function: to conduct the first two sortition processes of the transition — the selection of the Civic Transition Authority and the selection of the first National Sortition Assembly cohort. The PSC is dissolved by statute upon the delivery of the first NSA cohort to the CTA.

The PSC is composed as follows: a Chairperson appointed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, who must have no current or recent party-political affiliation and whose appointment is confirmed by a cross-party parliamentary committee; three statistical experts nominated respectively by the Royal Statistical Society, the ONS, and the Electoral Commission, each serving in a personal capacity rather than as representatives of those bodies; and two legal observers nominated by the Law Society and the Bar Council, with no vote but with the authority to certify the legal compliance of the process.

The PSC has no discretion over the selection outcome. It operates the cryptographic random selection mechanism — specified in Article 4.3 — applies the stratification parameters specified in the CRA, and delivers the selection results to the CTA in a form that allows full independent verification. It does not assess the eligibility of individual selectees beyond the criteria specified in the CRA; it does not manage exemption requests; and it has no authority over the subsequent conduct of any assembly.

Article 4.3 — The Cryptographic Random Selection Mechanism

The random selection mechanism used by the PSC — and subsequently by the permanent CSA — must satisfy the following technical requirements: it must be computationally verifiable, meaning that any party with access to the published inputs and the published algorithm can independently confirm that the outputs are correct; it must be manipulation-resistant, meaning that no party with access to the mechanism can alter the outcome without this alteration being detectable; and it must use a publicly verifiable source of randomness rather than a private random number generator.

The mechanism shall use a commitment scheme based on publicly available randomness sources — specifically, a combination of National Lottery draw results, a specified block of the Bitcoin blockchain, and outputs from the NIST Randomness Beacon — to generate the random seed from which all selections are derived. The seed generation process takes place publicly, in a live-streamed session, with the three randomness inputs announced in advance so that no party can have prepared manipulated inputs. The full technical specification of the mechanism shall be published no less than ninety days before the first selection takes place, and shall be subjected to independent cryptographic audit.

Article 4.4 — Selection of the Civic Transition Authority

The CTA is constituted by the PSC's first sortition process. The CTA consists of forty-five members, stratified by age band, gender, geographic region, and socioeconomic classification from the first-edition civic register. Members must be adults resident in the British Isles with no current or recent party-political affiliation — defined as no party membership, candidature, or paid employment by a political party within the preceding five years.

The forty-five member composition provides sufficient demographic breadth for the CTA to function as a legitimate transitional authority while remaining small enough to operate efficiently. The CTA does not make legislative decisions; it manages the transition process. Its decisions are governance decisions about sequencing, resource allocation, and institutional establishment — not substantive policy decisions, which are reserved for the first NSA session.

CTA members receive the full civic stipend from the date of their selection and serve for the duration of the transition period, defined as the period from the CTA's first session to the date on which the first NSA is seated and confirmed as constitutionally operational by the DSP. The maximum term of the CTA is thirty-six months from its first session; if the NSA is not seated within this period, the CTA must seek a parliamentary extension, publicly justified, from the Westminster Parliament.

Article 4.5 — Selection of the First National Sortition Assembly

The PSC's second sortition process selects the first cohort of the National Sortition Assembly: six hundred members, stratified from the civic register. This selection takes place when the PCRA certifies that the civic register is sufficiently complete — defined as containing at minimum ninety-two percent of the estimated adult resident population — and when the CTA has established the operational infrastructure necessary to receive and support the assembly.

The selection of the first NSA cohort is the moment at which the permanent Civic Sortition Authority comes into existence: the CRA provides that the PSC is automatically succeeded by the CSA upon delivery of the first NSA cohort. The CSA is itself constituted by the PSC's final act — the random selection of its initial membership from the civic register — before the PSC is dissolved. The CSA then manages all subsequent sortition processes, including the staggered selection of subsequent NSA cohorts and all RSA and LSA selections.

Part V — The Civic Transition Authority: Constitution and Limits

Article 5.1 — The CTA's Constitutional Position

The Civic Transition Authority is not a government. It is not a parliament. It has no authority to make policy, to appropriate public funds for substantive purposes, or to exercise any power beyond those specifically conferred by the CRA. Its constitutional position is that of a steward: it holds the institutional infrastructure of the existing state in trust for the Civic Commonwealth, maintains its operational continuity, and transfers that infrastructure to the NSA and the RSAs as they are constituted.

The CTA's authority is explicitly temporary, specifically bounded, and continuously monitored. It is temporary because it terminates on the seating of the first NSA. It is specifically bounded because the CRA enumerates exhaustively the powers the CTA may exercise; any action not within that enumeration is *ultra vires*. It is continuously monitored because the civil society oversight panel specified in Article 5.3 meets monthly and publishes a public assessment of CTA conduct.

Article 5.2 — The CTA's Enumerated Powers

The CTA is authorised to exercise the following powers, and no others.

- Maintain the operational continuity of all public services during the transition, with the resources available from existing fiscal arrangements and Treasury approval.
- Establish the operational infrastructure of the Civic Commonwealth's permanent institutions — the Civic Sortition Authority, the Civic Consequence Tribunal, the Democratic Standards Panel, and the Office of Democratic Remedy — by commissioning their physical premises, staffing frameworks, and operational procedures.
- Oversee the transfer of legislative functions from the existing parliamentary bodies to the NSA, on a domain-by-domain basis specified in the transition schedule at Part VII.
- Implement the Architecture of Dissolution (DDSA-DISS-001) in respect of the formal political party funding architecture, the commercial lobbying industry, and the revolving door provisions, on the timetable specified therein.
- Conduct the constitutional ratification deliberative process specified in Part XI, including the commissioning and funding of the regional deliberative assemblies.
- Maintain law and order through the existing policing and security services, transitioned to CTA oversight under the terms of Article 7.2.
- Manage the international recognition process specified in Part X.

Article 5.3 — Civil Society Oversight of the CTA

The CTA is subject to oversight by a Civil Society Oversight Panel (CSOP) consisting of twenty representatives drawn from established civil society organisations — charities, trade unions, faith communities, business associations, academic institutions, and community organisations — who are nominated by their constituent organisations and whose appointment is confirmed by the CTA itself on the basis of demonstrated independence from the existing party-political system.

The CSOP has no executive authority. It has the power to: attend all CTA meetings as observers; require the CTA to provide written explanations of any decision within seven working days; publish its assessment of CTA conduct monthly; and — by a two-thirds majority of its membership — refer a specific CTA decision to the Westminster Parliament for review as potentially *ultra vires*. The CSOP referral mechanism provides the democratic accountability of the CTA to the existing constitutional system while the new system is being established.

Article 5.4 — The CTA's Absolute Prohibitions

The following actions are absolutely prohibited to the CTA, regardless of circumstances.

- The CTA may not make any substantive policy decision on any matter within the legislative jurisdiction of the NSA. Substantive policy decisions include but are not limited to: tax changes, spending allocations beyond maintenance of existing service levels, changes to existing Civic Rules, and new agreements with international organisations.
- The CTA may not extend its own term beyond thirty-six months without parliamentary authorisation obtained through a public process.
- The CTA may not suspend or modify the civic register construction programme or the sortition selection schedule.
- The CTA may not dissolve the CSOP or modify its composition.
- The CTA may not invoke the Leadership Black Volume provisions; the LBV is reserved for the operational Civic Commonwealth and its designated crisis authorities.
- No CTA member may take up any position — paid or unpaid — in any organisation that lobbies or advocates before the NSA within five years of the completion of their CTA service.

Part VI — Professional Obligation Exemptions and Stipend Architecture

Article 6.1 — The Stipend Adequacy Problem

The adversarial critique correctly identifies that a civic stipend equivalent to the median national wage — approximately £34,000 to £35,000 per annum at 2026 levels — represents a material income reduction for assembly members in professions with above-median compensation: medical consultants, surgeons, engineers, senior academics, and those running established small businesses. This creates two distinct problems. First, such individuals may seek exemption in disproportionate numbers, systematically skewing the assembly's composition away from high-earning professions. Second, if they serve despite the financial cost, they may be placed under private financial pressure that compromises their deliberative independence.

Article 6.2 — The Dual-Track Stipend Structure

The civic stipend for NSA service shall be structured as follows. Track One — the Standard Civic Stipend — is paid at the median national wage, as specified in the existing corpus. Track Two — the Professional Continuity Supplement — is available to assembly members in defined professions where: (a) the median earnings of that profession exceed the civic stipend by more than thirty percent; and (b) withdrawal from active practice during the assembly term creates a material risk either to persons in the member's care or to the member's ability to return to practice at the end of service.

The Professional Continuity Supplement pays the difference between the civic stipend and the median earnings of the member's profession, up to a maximum supplement of one and a half times the civic stipend — producing a maximum total remuneration of two and a half times the median national wage. The supplement is funded from the civic commons and is paid directly to the member, not to any employing organisation.

The eligible professions for the Professional Continuity Supplement are determined by the NSA in its first legislative session, on the basis of a proposal from the expert secretariat and published earnings data. The list is reviewed every five years. It is expected to include medical and dental practitioners, veterinary surgeons, civil and structural engineers in safety-critical roles, and certain categories of legal professional.

Article 6.3 — Professional Obligation Exemptions

The existing corpus specifies exemptions for "serious health conditions" and "exceptional caring responsibilities." This Addendum adds a Professional Obligation Exemption category for the following specific circumstances: a surgeon currently responsible for a patient in a course of treatment that cannot be safely transferred within three months; a sole-trader small business operator who cannot arrange management cover and whose business would demonstrably fail during the assembly term; and a carer whose caring responsibilities cannot be met through the caring support package provided to assembly members.

Professional Obligation Exemptions are assessed by an independent Exemption Review Panel — three members, themselves sortition-selected — whose decisions are published in anonymised form and whose patterns of decisions are reviewed annually by the DSP to detect any systematic exemption of specific demographic or professional groups. The grant rate for Professional Obligation Exemptions is published quarterly. If the grant rate in any professional category exceeds twenty percent of those selected from that category, the NSA is automatically notified and must review the stipend and support provisions for that category.

Article 6.4 — Re-Selection After Exemption

An assembly member who is granted an exemption is returned to the civic register and is eligible for re-selection in a subsequent cohort. An exemption does not constitute a permanent exclusion from assembly service; it is a deferral for a specific term. Members who are deferred may volunteer for expedited re-selection in the next available cohort, if the circumstances that produced the exemption have resolved. A member who receives three consecutive exemptions is referred to the Exemption Review Panel for a formal assessment of whether a permanent exemption is warranted by their individual circumstances.

Part VII — Transition Phase Sequencing

Article 7.1 — The Transition Timeline Overview

The transition to the Civic Commonwealth proceeds through six sequential phases, each with defined entry conditions, key constitutional actions, responsible actors, and exit criteria. No phase may proceed to the next without the exit criteria of the preceding phase being met and certified by the CSOP. The timeline presented below assumes the preparatory legislation specified in Article 1.4 has been enacted; the extended timeline where it has not is noted for each phase.

Phase	Duration	Lead Actor	Key Constitutional Actions	Dependencies / Conditions
Phase 0	Ongoing (pre-moment)	DD&SA Foundation	Complete corpus; academic review; preparatory legislation advocacy; pilot assembly programme; ECHR diplomatic track; Venice Commission engagement	None — ongoing preparatory work
Phase 1	Months 1–3	Westminster Parliament	Enact CRA; establish PCRA; establish PSC; publish CRA text and legal basis; notify Council of Europe	Constitutional mandate obtained; mandate threshold met per Article 1.3
Phase 2	Months 1–18	PCRA + PSC	Construct civic register (primary sources); Coverage Survey; Open Registration Period; publish methodology for audit	Phase 1 complete; CRA enacted
Phase 3	Months 4–9	PSC + CTA	PSC conducts CTA selection from provisional register; CTA seated; CSOP constituted; CTA operational framework established	Phase 1 complete; provisional register at 80%+ coverage
Phase 4	Months 9–22	CTA	Regional deliberative assemblies for ratification; NSA sortition selection (PSC → CSA); NSA induction programme; first legislative session	Phase 2 complete (register at 92%+); Phase 3 complete
Phase 5	Months 18–30	CTA + NSA	Constitutional ratification referendum; RSA sortition selections; LSA sortition selections; Architecture of Dissolution implementation begins	Phase 4 complete; NSA operational
Phase 6	Months 24–36	NSA + RSAs + LSAs	CTA dissolved on NSA certification; CSA permanent; all three assembly tiers operational; existing parliamentary bodies formally wound down	Ratification referendum passed; all tiers seated and certified by DSP

Article 7.2 — Phase Entry and Exit Certification

The transition from each phase to the next requires a formal certification by the CSOP that the exit criteria of the current phase have been met. The CSOP issues a Phase Transition Certificate (PTC) within ten working days of a formal submission from the CTA claiming that exit criteria are satisfied. The PTC is a public document. If the CSOP declines to issue a PTC, it must publish its reasons within the same ten-day period, and the CTA may refer the dispute to the Westminster Parliament if it disagrees with the CSOP's assessment.

The Phase Transition Certificates constitute the constitutional audit trail of the transition: they document, in real time and in publicly accessible form, that each step of the transition has been completed to the required standard before the next step commenced. In any subsequent legal challenge to the transition, the PTCs are the primary evidence of procedural compliance.

Article 7.3 — The Extended Timeline (Without Preparatory Legislation)

If the preparatory legislation specified in Article 1.4 has not been enacted before the constitutional moment, the following adjustments apply to the timeline above. The Phase 2 register construction extends from eighteen months to thirty months, because the PCRA must negotiate data sharing agreements with HMRC, DWP, and NHS Digital from scratch rather than implementing pre-agreed frameworks. Phase 3 (CTA seating) is delayed accordingly, because the CTA selection requires a provisional register at eighty percent coverage, which is not achievable before month twelve without the preparatory frameworks. Total transition duration in the extended scenario is forty-eight months rather than thirty-six. This extended scenario is operationally manageable but increases the political risk of the interregnum period, making the preparatory legislation case more rather than less compelling.

Part VIII — Public Service Continuity During Transition

Article 8.1 — The Continuity Principle

The fundamental obligation of the Civic Commonwealth's transition architecture is that no inhabitant of the British Isles shall experience any degradation of the public services on which they depend as a consequence of the transition process. The NHS, the social security system, the education system, the transport infrastructure, and every other public service continues in operation throughout every phase of the transition, under the authority of the CTA and then of the NSA, without interruption.

The Continuity Principle creates a specific architectural requirement: the transition of governance authority from the existing system to the Civic Commonwealth must be domain-by-domain, not simultaneous. A simultaneous transfer of all legislative authority — enacted by the CRA on a fixed commencement date — would create a period in which the existing governance authority has been extinguished and the NSA's authority has not yet been exercised. In this vacuum, the administrative machinery of the state would be operating without clear legal authority to make any new decision. The domain-by-domain transfer eliminates this vacuum.

Article 8.2 — The Domain-by-Domain Transfer Schedule

The CRA shall specify a transfer schedule in which legislative authority over defined governance domains passes from the existing system to the Civic Commonwealth's institutions on a rolling basis, as those institutions are ready to receive and exercise that authority. The sequence of transfer is designed to prioritise domains where continuity risk is lowest and institutional readiness is highest, building institutional confidence before the most complex and politically sensitive transfers occur.

The following transfer sequence is recommended, subject to CTA and CSOP review during Phase 4. First to transfer: local amenities governance and planning functions, to LSAs as they are seated. Second: regional transport, housing standards, and environmental monitoring, to RSAs as they are seated. Third: education framework governance. Fourth: health governance framework. Fifth: social security framework. Sixth: fiscal policy framework and economic governance. Final: defence, foreign affairs, and constitutional architecture — to the NSA in its established second session.

During the transfer process for each domain, a Joint Stewardship Committee (JSC) operates for a period of three months: it consists of representatives of the existing government department and representatives of the receiving assembly, and it manages the knowledge transfer and institutional handover. JSCs are not decision-making bodies; they are operational handover mechanisms. Their proceedings are published in full.

Article 8.3 — Civil Service Continuity

The professional civil service — the administrative body through which governance decisions are implemented — continues in operation throughout the transition under the authority of the CTA and then of the NSA. Civil servants' employment terms are protected: no civil servant is made compulsorily redundant as a direct consequence of the transition. The administrative functions of the existing system are required by the Civic Commonwealth's governance architecture; what changes is who sets the direction, not who implements it.

Senior civil servants — Permanent Secretaries and Directors General — are required to take a Constitutional Neutrality Pledge at the commencement of Phase 3, committing them to serve the Civic Commonwealth's institutions with the same professionalism with which they have served ministers. The Pledge is a public document, signed individually, and its signatories are published. Any senior civil

servant who declines to take the Pledge is offered an enhanced voluntary redundancy package. The CTA maintains a record of all those who decline.

Part IX — Security Institutions and Media During the Transition

Article 9.1 — The Security Institution Problem

The adversarial critique correctly identifies that existing security and policing institutions — the Metropolitan Police, the national policing bodies, the security services (MI5, MI6, GCHQ), and the armed forces — have their own institutional cultures, command structures, and historical patterns of relationship with the political authority they serve. These institutions are not neutral instruments; they have interests, identities, and — in some cases — histories of resistance to political change that their leadership deemed threatening to institutional continuity.

The transition architecture addresses the security institution problem through three mechanisms: formal authority transfer, constitutional reaffirmation of democratic control, and leadership accountability. None of these mechanisms guarantees institutional cooperation, but together they reduce the risk of institutional resistance while maximising the legitimacy of any response to resistance that does occur.

Article 9.2 — Transfer of Security Institution Oversight to the CTA

On the commencement date of the CRA, the ministerial oversight of all policing, security, and armed forces institutions transfers from the Secretary of State to the CTA, through a specific provision of the CRA that amends the relevant existing legislation. The Chief Constables, Director General of MI5, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Director GCHQ, and Chiefs of Staff all have new statutory accountability — to the CTA — from this date.

The CTA's security oversight is exercised through a Security Oversight Committee (SOC) of five CTA members, selected by the CTA from its own membership, who receive security clearances within thirty days of CTA seating. The SOC meets monthly with the heads of each security and policing institution. The existence and composition of the SOC are public; its proceedings on operational matters are classified.

Article 9.3 — Constitutional Reaffirmation of Democratic Control

The CRA shall contain an explicit Constitutional Reaffirmation of Democratic Control provision, which requires the most senior leadership of each security institution to make a public statement within thirty days of the CRA's commencement, affirming that the institution operates under the authority of the constitutional order and will transfer that accountability to the NSA when it is seated. The provision does not require institutional leaders to endorse the Civic Commonwealth as a political project; it requires them to affirm their constitutional obligation to serve whichever government the constitutional process produces.

Any institutional leader who declines to make the Constitutional Reaffirmation is removed from post by the CTA's authority under the CRA. The removal is public, with published reasons. The appointment of a successor, from within the institution's existing leadership structure, is made by the CTA within seven days.

Article 9.4 — The Media Transition Problem

The adversarial critique identifies that the transition communications environment will be hostile: existing national media — most of which is controlled by proprietors with material interests in the continuation of the existing system — will cover the transition adversarially. The DD&SA architecture cannot control the existing media; the CTASA provisions that address media concentration require time to implement and cannot be applied retroactively to existing ownership structures.

The transition media strategy therefore rests on four elements. First, direct-to-inhabitant communication through a Civic Commonwealth digital publishing platform, established by the CTA within thirty days of seating, that publishes all CTA decisions, all PCRA methodology documents, all Phase Transition Certificates, and a daily plain-language summary of transition progress. This platform is a public resource, not a propaganda organ; it publishes the CSOP's assessments of CTA conduct alongside the CTA's own outputs.

Second, media access parity: the CTA is available to all media organisations on equal terms. No media organisation receives exclusive access, advance briefings, or privileged relationships with CTA members. The CTA holds public press conferences on a fixed schedule, answers all questions on the record, and provides the same materials simultaneously to all credentialed journalists.

Third, public broadcasting protection: the BBC and its devolved equivalents are explicitly protected from CTA influence on their editorial decisions by a specific provision of the CRA that preserves their existing charter obligations and strengthens their independence from the CTA as they would be from any government. The CTA explicitly renounces any authority over BBC editorial decisions.

Fourth, legal protection against deliberate disinformation: the CRA shall include a Transition Disinformation Provision making it a specific offence to publish materially false statements of fact — not opinion, but verifiable fact — about the transition process, the composition of the CTA, or the operation of the civic register, with the intent to cause public disorder or to undermine the constitutional process. The provision is drawn narrowly to protect freedom of expression while providing a legal remedy against coordinated disinformation campaigns.

Part X — International Recognition and Treaty Continuity

Article 10.1 — The Continuity of International Obligations

The Civic Commonwealth of the British Isles is the constitutional successor state to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to such other political entities as participate in the Civic Commonwealth through the processes specified in Part II. As successor state, the Civic Commonwealth inherits all treaty obligations of its predecessor states, including membership of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, the WTO, and all bilateral treaties currently in force. The CRA explicitly provides for this succession, and the Civic Commonwealth notifies all treaty partners of its succession within thirty days of the CRA's commencement.

The continuity of treaty obligations is not merely a diplomatic courtesy; it is a constitutional commitment. The NSA may in due course choose to modify, withdraw from, or negotiate new terms in respect of any specific treaty; this is within its constitutional authority as the sovereign legislative body of the Civic Commonwealth. But it does so through the normal processes of international law, not through unilateral repudiation.

Article 10.2 — Proactive International Recognition Strategy

The CTA shall pursue a proactive international recognition strategy from its first session. The objective is to secure formal recognition of the Civic Commonwealth's governmental authority from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the G7, the EU, Ireland, and the Commonwealth of Nations, within six months of Phase 3 commencement.

The recognition strategy is built on three arguments. First, constitutional legitimacy: the Civic Commonwealth is established through a legal process that is constitutionally grounded in the existing system, has obtained a democratic mandate, and is implementing a constitutionally ratified programme. It is not a coup, a revolution, or a seizure of power; it is a constitutional reform of the kind that democracies undertake. Second, treaty continuity: international partners' existing treaties and economic relationships are not disrupted; the Civic Commonwealth inherits and honours them. Third, economic stability: the Civic Commonwealth's fiscal architecture maintains continuity of existing economic relationships and provides international partners with the same counterparties and contractual frameworks they currently deal with.

Article 10.3 — Financial Market Management During Transition

The adversarial critique notes that financial markets may respond adversarially to the transition, and that elected governments are structurally vulnerable to market intimidation in a way that sortition assemblies are not. While the structural argument is correct, the transition period itself — before the NSA is fully operational — presents a specific vulnerability because markets may price the uncertainty of transition rather than the character of the destination.

The CTA shall engage proactively with the Bank of England, HM Treasury, and major institutional investors from the first week of Phase 3, providing a detailed briefing on the transition timeline, the fiscal continuity provisions, and the economic governance framework of the Civic Commonwealth. The CTA shall also publish a formal Fiscal Continuity Statement on its first day of operation, committing to maintain all existing debt obligations, maintain the Bank of England's operational independence during the transition, and seek no changes to fiscal policy without NSA authorisation.

Part XI — The Constitutional Ratification Process

Article 11.1 — The Ratification Referendum

The Civic Commonwealth's Foundational Rules derive their ultimate authority from the genuine consent of the inhabitants of the British Isles, expressed through a constitutional ratification referendum conducted after a structured deliberative process. The referendum is not an advisory poll; it is the constitutive act of the Civic Commonwealth. A positive outcome activates the Foundational Rules and terminates the CTA's authority. A negative outcome triggers the failure protocol specified in Part XII.

The ratification referendum is conducted at Phase 5 of the transition, when the NSA has been seated and the regional deliberative assemblies have completed their work. It is a binary question: "Do you approve the Constitution of the Civic Commonwealth of the British Isles as the foundational law of your governance?" The question is tested for public comprehension through a Citizens' Language Review Panel — a sortition-selected body of twenty inhabitants — before it is finalised.

Article 11.2 — The Regional Deliberative Assemblies

Before the ratification referendum, the CTA commissions regional deliberative assemblies — one per nation or major region, conducted under the full Fishkin deliberative protocol — in which randomly selected inhabitants deliberate on the Constitution of the Civic Commonwealth. Each regional assembly consists of one hundred and fifty members, serves for eight weekends over a six-month period, and produces a structured report identifying areas of consensus, areas of concern, and specific modifications requested.

The regional assembly reports are taken seriously as constitutional inputs, not merely as communication exercises. The NSA — in session before the referendum is held — considers each regional assembly report and produces a formal response to each concern raised, either accepting the modification requested, explaining why it cannot be accepted as written, or proposing an alternative formulation that addresses the concern. The ratification referendum is held on the modified Constitution, not the original.

Article 11.3 — The Ratification Threshold

The ratification referendum requires: (a) a majority of votes cast in favour across the Civic Commonwealth as a whole; (b) a majority of votes cast in favour in at least three of the four principal nations (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland); and (c) a turnout of no less than fifty percent of the eligible population in each of the four principal nations. These thresholds are demanding because the Civic Commonwealth's Foundational Rules are intended to be durable: they should command broad consent across the archipelago, not merely a simple national majority.

A nation that does not produce a majority in favour but does meet the turnout threshold is not excluded from the Civic Commonwealth; it is recognised as a nation where significant constitutional debate continues, and the NSA is required to commission a further regional deliberative process in that nation within twelve months of the referendum, addressed specifically to the concerns that produced the negative majority.

Part XII — Failure Protocols

Article 12.1 — The Purpose of Failure Protocols

A constitutional architecture that does not specify what happens when it fails is not a serious constitutional architecture. Every element of the transition described in this Addendum is designed to succeed; none is immune to failure. The following failure protocols specify, for each major point of potential failure, the constitutional response that maintains the Civic Commonwealth's commitment to democratic legitimacy and procedural integrity even when the specific mechanism has not produced the expected outcome.

Article 12.2 — Legal Challenge to the CRA

If a legal challenge is brought against the CRA in the domestic courts, the transition continues without interruption unless a court issues a specific interim injunction staying a specific provision. The CTA complies with all court orders in full. If a provision of the CRA is struck down by the courts, the CTA submits an emergency legislative proposal to Westminster within fourteen days, identifying the minimum legislative amendment required to remedy the legal defect. The NSA, when seated, takes over this function.

If an ECtHR proceeding results in interim measures that affect the transition, the CTA complies immediately with those measures while pursuing the substantive proceedings. The compliance is communicated publicly, with a full explanation of the legal position, within forty-eight hours of receipt of the interim measures order.

Article 12.3 — Institutional Resistance

If an existing institution — a government department, a policing body, a security service — refuses to recognise the authority of the CTA, the following protocol applies. First, the CSOP is immediately notified and publishes the refusal and the identity of the refusing institution within twenty-four hours. Second, the CTA issues a formal demand for compliance under the CRA's authority, with a forty-eight hour response deadline. Third, if compliance is not forthcoming, the CTA refers the matter to the Westminster Parliament — which retains its authority during the transition as a supervisory institution — for emergency legislative action. Fourth, if parliamentary action does not resolve the resistance, the CTA publishes a full public account of the refusal and its consequences and invites the affected institution's leadership to attend a public hearing before the CSOP.

The protocol does not include provision for the use of force to compel institutional compliance. The Civic Commonwealth's authority rests on democratic legitimacy and constitutional process; the use of coercive force to impose institutional authority would undermine both. The primary tool of the CTA in the face of institutional resistance is transparency — making the resistance publicly visible so that democratic pressure operates on the resisting institution from below.

Article 12.4 — Ratification Referendum Failure

If the ratification referendum does not achieve the threshold specified in Article 11.3, the following protocol applies. The transition is not automatically reversed. The CTA continues to operate, and the NSA continues to function, for a period of twelve months after the referendum result. During this period, the NSA commissions an urgent deliberative process to understand the basis of the negative outcome — regional deliberative assemblies in each nation where the threshold was not met — and produces a revised constitutional proposal that addresses the concerns identified.

The revised proposal is put to a second ratification referendum within eighteen months of the first. If the second referendum also fails to achieve the threshold, the CTA prepares a transition back to the existing constitutional arrangements — as modified by such elements of the DD&SA architecture as the NSA has already enacted and that command genuine public support — and the Westminster Parliament is asked to legislate for this partial constitutional settlement. The Civic Commonwealth in its full form is not established; but the experience of the transition — the citizens' assemblies, the deliberative processes, the operational experience of the NSA and early RSAs — will have permanently altered the constitutional landscape of the British Isles in the direction of more genuine popular self-governance.

Article 12.5 — CTA Term Expiry Without Ratification

If the CTA's thirty-six month maximum term expires before the ratification referendum has been held, the CTA must seek a parliamentary extension. The extension request is published and debated in Westminster within ten sitting days. The extension, if granted, is for a maximum of twelve further months and is subject to a monthly CSOP report to Westminster on transition progress. If the extension is not granted, the CTA is dissolved and authority reverts to an emergency parliamentary committee pending a resolution of the constitutional impasse.

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